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ANSELM ON FREE CHOICE AND
CHARACTER FORMATION
Thomas Williams

Character formation is a central theme in Katherin Rogers’s Freedom and SelfCreation: Anselmian Libertarianism. According to Rogers, Anselm holds that
the purpose of free choice is to afford creatures the possibility of creating
their own characters through their free choices. I argue that Anselm has no
doctrine of character formation. Accordingly, he does not hold the view of
the purpose of free choice that Rogers attributes to him. Creatures cannot
bring about justice in themselves, let alone increase it by their own efforts;
any moral progress is divine gift, not creaturely achievement. I offer an alternative account of the purpose of free choice.

Character formation is a central theme in Katherin Rogers’s recent exposition of Anselm in Freedom and Self-Creation: Anselmian Libertarianism.
According to Rogers, Anselm holds (1) that the purpose of free choice is
to afford creatures the possibility of creating their own characters through
their free choices, (2) that choices can be determined by an agent’s character, and (3) that such character-determined choices are nonetheless free
if the character that determines them is itself a product of free choices.
All these attributions are mistaken. For Anselm has no doctrine of
character formation or habituation. Accordingly, he does not hold that the
purpose of free choice is to afford creatures the possibility of creating their
own characters through their choices. Likewise, he does not envision the
possibility that a choice could be determined by an agent’s character, and
so he has no view about whether such a choice would be free.
After briefly showing that Rogers does indeed attribute all these claims
to Anselm himself (and not merely to “the Anselmian”), I lay out the textual and philosophical case against Rogers’s view. I show first that there is
no text in the philosophical and theological works to support a doctrine of
character formation in Anselm, and that the vocabulary of character, habituation, and virtue is almost entirely absent from his works. I then turn
to broader thematic arguments, showing that the claims about character
formation that Rogers attributes to Anselm are at odds with what Anselm
says about both the purpose of free choice and the reason that the good
angels can no longer sin.
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1. Rogers’s Attributions to Anselm
Rogers very properly distinguishes between what Anselm held and what
someone inspired by Anselm might hold. As she puts it,
I attempt to cast the discussion in the contemporary idiom and within the
contemporary literature, and so a new character, the Anselmian, has to be
introduced. The Anselmian embraces the basic outline initially proposed
by Anselm, and then attempts to fill it in and build upon it. “Anselm” and
“Anselm’s” indicate that it is indeed the historical figure whose thought is
expressed.1

My concern in this paper is to argue that Rogers is mistaken in attributing
to Anselm the claims that she does, and so I begin by showing that she
does in fact attribute claims (1)–(3) to Anselm, the historical figure, and
not merely to the Anselmian.
As for (1), that the purpose of free choice is to afford creatures the possibility of creating their own characters through their free choices, we find
this attributed to Anselm in several places. For example:
In Anselm’s view the value of free will is that it allows for self-creation.2
For Anselm the whole point of our being able to choose freely is that it bestows upon us the objective value of being the sorts of things that can imitate
God by contributing to the creation of ourselves.3
Anselm proposes libertarianism in defense of the elevated metaphysical status of the created agent as a self-creator.4
The central motivation for Anselm’s construction of his libertarian theory is
to elaborate a view which allows for created agents to self-create.5

As for (2), that choices can be determined by an agent’s character, and
(3) that such character-determined choices are nonetheless free if the character that determines them is itself a product of free choices, consider the
following passages.
Anselm holds that a choice which is determined by the agent’s character
may be considered a se if the character itself is the product of the agent’s past
a se choices.6
Anselm’s theory holds that an agent’s responsibility for character-determined choices may be traceable to his responsibility for his self-formed
character.7

Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 2.
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 3–4.
3
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 25.
4
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 33.
5
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 209.
6
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 13.
7
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 216.
1
2
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She also says that Anselm “assumes the tracing thesis,” which she defines
as the view “that you may be responsible for your character-determined
choices if you are responsible for your character.”8
Thus it is clear that Rogers attributes claims (1)–(3) to Anselm himself,
and not merely to an Anselmian.
2. Anselm Has No Doctrine of Character Formation
Anselm has no doctrine of character formation. But how does one go
about showing a negative of this sort? It ought to be enough to point out
that Rogers nowhere cites a text of Anselm that states, entails, presupposes, or in any other way indicates a belief in the possibility, let alone
the importance, of character formation. (For there is no such text for her
to cite.) But she makes the claim so many times, and it is so central to the
argument of her book, that denying it seems to call for more argument
than a one-sentence dismissal. So I begin by showing that the language
of character, habit, and virtue is almost entirely absent from Anselm’s
work. I then examine the one virtue-word that is commonly found in
Anselm—iustitia—and show that it does not refer to a stable state of character acquired by habituation. Finally, I show that, far from believing in
character formation, Anselm holds that rectitude of will is frighteningly
precarious, easily lost (or, rather, thrown away) at any time.
One looks almost entirely in vain in the philosophical and theological
treatises for the language of character. Mores, for example, is found only
once:
Let no one, therefore, be in a hurry to plunge into the thicket of divine questions unless he has first sought in firmness of faith the weight of good character (morum) and wisdom, lest he should run carelessly and frivolously
along the many side-roads of sophistries and be snared by some obstinate
falsehood.9

Virtus is almost always “strength” or “power”; only once does it mean
“virtue” (that is, a settled disposition or trait of character by which one
is disposed to act rightly), and even there it appears in a description of a
mistaken view of free choice:

Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 217.
Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi 1 (II:9). (All citations to Anselm’s works are followed by
a parenthetical reference to the volume and page number of the critical edition (Schmitt,
Opera Omnia) and all translations are my own.) Virtus in the sense of “virtue” is much more
common in the prayers and (especially) in the letters, but like Rogers I am concerned with
Anselm’s explicit theorizing about free choice in his philosophical and theological works. An
examination of his use of virtue-language in the letters would take us too far afield, and since
Anselm is not working out philosophical theories about ethics and moral psychology in the
letters in the way that he does in the treatises, it is fair to say that such an examination would
not be germane to the project of this paper. Nevertheless, the letters do offer insight into
Anselm’s ethical thought (as Sandra Visser and I discuss in our chapter on Anselm’s ethics
in Anselm), and I consider some evidence from the letters below, in the section on “Moral
Progress in Human Beings.”
8
9
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Therefore, since we find some statements in Holy Scripture that appear to
speak in favor of grace alone, and others that are thought to uphold free
choice alone apart from grace, there have been certain arrogant people who
have thought the whole efficacy of the virtues (virtutum) rests in freedom
of choice alone, and there are many in our own day who have given up all
hope that free choice is anything at all.10

Habitus is always either the perfect participle of habere or the monastic
habit, never the settled disposition corresponding to Aristotle’s hexis.
The vocabulary of the cardinal virtues, so common in Augustine, is
likewise nearly absent from Anselm’s work. Fortitudo for Anselm always
means “strength,” never “courage.” Prudentia appears three times in the
philosophical works, once11 with the meaning “good judgment” (not specially confined to the moral domain) and twice12 as an honorific, “Your
Prudence,” as one might say “Your Grace” or “Your Reverence.” The
word temperantia never appears in Anselm.
There is, however, one piece of the classical vocabulary of virtue that is
central in Anselm’s moral thought: iustitia, justice. What will emerge over
the course of the rest of the paper is that justice likewise is not a state of
character in the sense that Rogers envisions. It is acquired not by habituation but by divine gift; there is nothing anyone can do either to attain it or
to increase it. Moreover, our possession of justice in this life is precarious,
easily lost (or, to speak strictly, easily thrown away). Anselmian justice is
therefore not a firm state of character, second nature, along the lines of an
Aristotelian hexis. But before I can establish this point more fully, I need
to examine what Anselm says about the purpose of free choice and about
why the good angels are no longer able to sin.
3. The Purpose of Free Choice
Rogers is right that the purpose of free choice is to make room for creatures
to have something from themselves, something that is not owed entirely
to God. Since this point is not in dispute between us, I will not belabor
it. Where we differ is in identifying what creatures are said to have from
themselves through free choice. For Rogers, creatures have their characters
through themselves; they engage in a kind of self-creation through the free
choices that shape their characters. For example, she claims that Anselm
is motivated to pioneer this position [libertarianism] by the thought that if
we human beings (and any other created rational and free agents there may
be) are to bear any responsibility for what we do and, more importantly,
for the kind of people we are, then we must be able to make choices which
truly come from ourselves. He believes, as an entailment of his Christian
faith, that God made us in His image. And he takes that to include the point
Anselm, De concordia 3.1 (II:264).
Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi 1 (II:4).
12
Anselm, Monologion, epist. ad Lanfrancum (I:5); Anselm, Epistola de sacrificio azimi et
fermentati, prooem. (II:223).
10
11
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that we are remarkable reflections in that we are able to participate in the
creation of our own characters.13

“The point of freedom is self-creation,” she says elsewhere,14 and “in
Anselm’s view the value of free will is that it allows for self-creation.”15
She even goes so far as to say that we “are uniquely in the image of God
in that, unlike everything else, we can participate in our own creation by
making ourselves better on our own.”16
But in fact what Anselm says consistently and repeatedly is not that
we create our characters or make ourselves better (a thoroughly Pelagian
idea, surely), but rather that we retain or preserve justice. Whatever justice
we may possess must be received from God, not achieved by our own
character-building efforts or free choices. As I have argued elsewhere,17
our choice to preserve justice is our own; it is from ourselves, to use
Rogers’s preferred formulation. It is from God only in the sense that God
created the will by which we choose and allowed us the free exercise of
that power of choice.
By contrast, our having justice is from God. We can speak of a creature’s giving himself justice, but only in the sense that the creature could
have thrown justice away and didn’t, not in the sense that the creature
brought it about that he had, or increased in, justice. Anselm could hardly
be clearer about this:
the [angel] who stayed put (stetit) in the truth in which he was made did
not make himself not have justice, although he could have; and thus he both
gave himself justice and received all this from God. For both angels received
from God the having of justice, the ability to retain justice, and the ability
to abandon it. God gave them this last ability so that they could, in a certain
way, give justice to themselves. For if there was no way in which they were
able to take away justice from themselves, there was also no way in which
they were able to give it to themselves.18

In other words, the good angels made themselves just, or gave themselves
justice, only in the sense that by the exercise of their own God-given
free choice they retained the justice God had already given them, even
though they had the power to abandon justice. They did not bring about
13
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 1. As I have shown elsewhere (Williams, “Review”),
the association Rogers draws here between our being in the image of God and our having
free choice—an association frequently made in both Anselm on Freedom (11, 20, 56, 72, 83, 87,
106–107, 124, 201, 205) and Freedom and Self-Creation (1, 2, 19, 24, 41, 73, 156, 173)—is her own
invention. On the very rare occasions on which Anselm mentions our bearing the divine
image (only in Monologion 67–68 and Proslogion 1), he understands that image as consisting
in the Trinitarian structure and activity of the rational mind, especially when directed to
remembering, understanding, and loving God.
14
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 3.
15
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 3–4.
16
Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 24 (emphasis in original).
17
Williams, “Anselm’s Quiet Radicalism.”
18
Anselm, De casu diaboli 18 (I:263).
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in themselves any justice that was not previously present in them, or even
increase in themselves the justice that was already present. There is therefore no sense in which they can be said to form their own characters—let
alone to make themselves better—through their primal choice of justice
over advantage.
4. Why the Good Angels Cannot Sin
Rogers is of course correct that the good angels, those who made the
primal choice for justice over advantage, can no longer sin. But the explanation she offers for their inability to sin is entirely at odds with Anselm’s
account. According to her, the good angels’ primal choice establishes such
a firm character in them that they can no longer choose advantage over
justice; their characters are such that they cannot but choose rightly.19 But
Anselm says otherwise. To begin with, it is hard to imagine that a single
choice—and the angels had only a single choice—could so firmly fix one’s
character. Of course, angelic psychology may, for all we know, be different
from ours in some relevant way such that for angels, unlike for us, a single
choice can fix their character firmly and for good. But by reflecting on
human choice we can see why the primal angelic choice as Anselm describes it is not one that could fix their characters in that way.
Suppose one afternoon, feeling tempted to fritter away my time in idleness, I choose instead to sit down at the piano and put in a good hour
of serious practice. That choice might well make it a bit easier for me to
choose practice over idleness the next time the opportunity arises—this
is precisely how habits are formed, after all—but it certainly does not so
fix my character that I can never again choose idleness over practice. But
although this choice does not fix my character, it does arguably change
something intrinsic to me. (Otherwise how could it contribute to forming
my character or establishing a habit?) My motivation to practice, or my
disposition to choose to practice, is strengthened, if only slightly; my motivation to fritter my time away, or my disposition to avoid productive
activity in favor of idleness, is weakened, if (again) only slightly.
Without some such intrinsic change in the agent, there is no improvement in character, whether the improvement is incremental or once-for-all.
And the key point is that on Anselm’s description of the primal angelic
choice, there is no such intrinsic change in the good angels. It is telling that
the word Anselm uses to characterize their primal choice is stetit: the good
angels stayed put. Nothing intrinsic to them changed as a result of their
choice: they retained the same motivational structure, the same affectiones,
that they had before the choice. No desire, no motivation, no disposition
in them changed even in the slightest. So it makes even less sense in the
angels’ case to posit complete habituation through a single choice than it
does in my own case.
19
For example, “the good angels forever set their character for good by clinging to the
justice that God has given them” (Rogers, Freedom and Self-Creation, 217).
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Fortunately there is no need to attribute to Anselm any such theory of
complete habituation through a single choice. He is quite clear that the
reason the angels can no longer sin is that God gave them, as a reward for
their primal choice of justice over advantage, whatever advantage they
had lacked before that choice:
And so the good angels willed the justice that they had, rather than that
additional something which they didn’t have. As far as their own will was
concerned, they lost that good (as it were) for the sake of justice; but they
received it as a reward for justice, and they remained for ever in secure possession of what they had. Hence, they have progressed so far that they have
attained everything they could will, and they no longer see what more they
could will; and because of this they are unable to sin.20

So it is not because of any change intrinsic to their will—because they
have developed a firm character they didn’t have before—that they can
no longer sin. They retain exactly the same desires, the same affectiones,
they had before. Rather, it is because of a change extrinsic to their will:
God gives them the additional something (illud plus)21 that he had withheld from them before their primal choice. Given that now, as before, they
can will only justice and advantage, and there is no longer any advantage
they lack that they could will in preference to justice, they cannot fail to
will justice. There is nothing left that they could want or choose unjustly.
It is God’s gift of complete happiness, not their own free choice and some
habituation or character formation resulting from that choice, that makes
them unable to sin.
How, then, are the good angels still free? Anselm’s answer is somewhat perfunctory. In the final chapter of On Freedom of Choice, in which
Anselm lays out his classification of the varieties of free choice, he says
that the freedom of the good angels (1) “is made by or received from
God,” (2) “has rectitude that it preserves,” and indeed (3) “has rectitude
inseparably.”22 This power meets the definition of freedom of choice as
the power to preserve rectitude of will for its own sake. One might worry
whether “for its own sake” is still applicable—either because it is their
perfect happiness that eliminates the possibility of choosing injustice or
because they now know, thanks to the example of the fallen angels, that
disobedience would be punished with the severest unhappiness. Are they
not then, at least, in part preserving rectitude of will for the sake of maintaining happiness, rather than (or in addition to) preserving it for the sake
of rectitude itself?

Anselm, De casu diaboli 6 (I:243).
Anselm, De casu diaboli 6 (I:243). Of this “additional something” Anselm says simply, “I
don’t know what it was. But whatever it might have been, all we need to know is that it was
something they were able to attain, which they did not receive when they were created, in
order that they might advance to it by their own merit” (De casu diaboli 6 [I:244]).
22
Anselm, De libertate arbitrii 14 (I:226)
20
21
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Anselm shrugs off such worries as irrelevant: “So if the good angel
is said to be no longer able to sin solely because he has this knowledge
[of the consequences of disobedience], it is perfectly clear that just as
the knowledge itself, which was acquired by his praiseworthy perseverance, is glorious, so also the inability to sin that arises out of that glorious
knowledge is to his glory.”23 Note that his real interest here is in defending
the claim that the angel’s inability to sin redounds to the angel’s credit. He
offers no argument for the claim that the angel’s further actions are free;
in fact, nowhere in his work does he even state that the acts of angels who
have been confirmed in goodness are free, let alone offer an argument for
that claim. Unlike Rogers, Anselm sees nothing of theoretical interest in
that question.24 He is content with saying that they are praiseworthy for
their justice.
5. Moral Progress in Human Beings
If Anselm were interested in character formation in the way that Rogers
maintains, he would certainly not have used the primal angelic choice to
lay out his theoretical understanding of free choice. The angels have a
single choice, not a series of choices of the sort by which character can
be developed. Moreover, the angels who choose justly become unable to
sin, not because anything has changed in them—not because they have
developed a certain sort of character—but because something external
to them changes: God gives them the only aspect of happiness they had
lacked, and so there is no longer anything they could will unjustly. Finally,
Anselm is barely interested in the freedom of the angels who have been
confirmed in goodness; he is far more concerned about their praiseworthiness. The primal angelic choice is thus an astoundingly inept device for
Anselm to rely on if indeed he is trying to develop the view that Rogers
attributes to him.25
There is, however, conceptual room for some emphasis on character
formation when it comes to human beings. For we face many choices over
a long period of time, and repeated choices of a certain sort form our characters, for good or ill. So to see whether something of Rogers’s thesis can
be salvaged, I turn to the case of human beings. Unfortunately for Rogers,
Anselm’s account of human moral development is every bit as inhospitable to her reading as his account of the once-for-all angelic choice.
To begin with, far from thinking that a human being in this life could
possess a firm, reliable good character, Anselm emphasizes that our possession of justice is precarious. Justice is easily lost—or, rather, thrown
away. We cannot either acquire or develop justice by our own efforts, but
Anselm, De casu diaboli 25 (I:272).
The explanation Sandra Visser and I gave in Anselm, 184, of how an angel confirmed in
goodness can preserve rectitude “on his own steam” seems a plausible account for Anselm
to adopt, but it can claim no direct support in the texts of Anselm, who never considers the
question.
25
On this point, see further Visser, “Review.”
23
24
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we can at any point lose it by our own negligence. So Anselm warns the
monks of Saint Werburgh at Chester:
Although we can neither have nor preserve anything except through God,
it is only as a result of our own negligence that we lose it or fall away from
it. Quite often this starts with the slightest matters. Our crafty Enemy often
deceives us by persuading us that not much hangs on such things. But what
follows is the grave harm of which we read in Scripture: “One who does not
heed small things falls little by little.”26

Since justice can be so easily lost, the moral life requires exceptional vigilance:
This present life is a journey, and as long as we are alive, we do nothing but
travel. We are always going either upward or downward: either upward
toward heaven or downward toward hell. When we do some good work,
we take one step upward; but when we sin in any way, we take one step
downward. . . . Now it is important to recognize that one goes downward
far more quickly and easily than upward. For this reason, in every will and
in every act Christian men and women ought to pay attention to whether
they are on the upward or the downward path. Let them wholeheartedly
embrace those in which they see themselves ascending. But as for those in
which they recognize the downward path, let them flee and renounce them
as though they were hell itself.27

This sort of wariness about how easy it is to abandon justice—how readily
one can fall into sin, how easily even good intentions can become corrupted28—pervades Anselm’s letters. It is not a wariness one would expect
from someone who believes wholeheartedly in the centrality of character
formation in the moral life.
Yet I must admit that the passage just quoted cuts both ways. Anselm
speaks not only of the downward path but also of the upward path; and
although “one goes downward far more quickly and easily than upward,”
one can apparently go upward. Perhaps here at least is some hint of character formation, of moral improvement deriving from repeated good
choices, in Anselm.
Anselm envisions two different kinds of moral improvement: increase
in the intensity of justice and increase in the extent of justice. In On the
Virginal Conception, and On Original Sin 24 Anselm explains what it means
for one person to be more just than another in terms of intensity:
In fact, someone is more just than another just person only if by his will he
either pursues or avoids more strongly what he ought to; similarly, someone
is more unjust than another unjust person only if he either loves or spurns
more strongly what he ought not.29
26
Letter 231 to the monks of the monastery of Saint Werburgh at Chester, ca. 1102 (IV:136–
137), quoting Ecclesiasticus 19:1.
27
Letter 420 to Basilia (V:365–366). See also Letters 2, 167, 183, 184, and 403.
28
On this see especially Letter 80 to Abbot Paul (III:203–204).
29
Anselm, De conceptu virginali 24 (II:167).
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Note that Anselm says here that this is the only way in which one person
can be more just than another, even though later, in De concordia, he will envision another way: increase in the extent of justice. Note also that, strictly
speaking, he is telling us how to compare two different people rather than
a given person at different times. It is, however, a natural extension of his
thought to suppose that just as Mary is more just than I am now because
she clings to the good more tenaciously, so too I am more just than I was
two years ago because I cling to the good more tenaciously. Anselm says
nothing here about how such an increase in justice comes about.
For that we must turn to the much fuller discussion in De concordia
3.3–6, where Anselm envisions increase in the extent as well as the intensity of justice. The consistent message of the discussion in De concordia is
that “no creature has this rectitude of will I have been talking about except
through God’s grace,”30 whether we are talking about the initial rectitude
of will that makes someone just or the further rectitude of will that makes
someone increase in justice. Human beings can preserve or abandon that
rectitude, but they cannot cause it to increase; increase in justice is gift, not
achievement.
Accordingly, Anselm says,
just as no one receives rectitude unless grace comes first, no one preserves
rectitude unless that same grace continues. So even though rectitude is preserved through free choice, the preserving of rectitude should not be attributed to free choice so much as it should be attributed to grace, since free
choice has and preserves rectitude only through prevenient and subsequent
grace. Now grace follows upon its previous gift in such a way that, whether
the grace be great or small, it never ceases to give that gift unless free choice
wills something else and thereby abandons the rectitude it has received.
For this rectitude never ceases to be present in the will unless the will wills
something else that is incompatible with rectitude. For example, someone
receives the rectitude of willing sobriety and then throws it away by willing
immoderate pleasure from drinking. When he does this, it is by his own
will, and therefore by his own fault, that he loses the grace he had received.31

The idea of increase in justice by extent slips in here almost unnoticed: the
suggestion is that one could have rectitude in some other domain and then
receive “the rectitude of willing sobriety” as an additional gift (and then,
of course, throw it away).32 The same idea recurs a little later on, when
Anselm observes, “Some people, after all, are just in one respect and unjust
in another: for example, someone who is chaste but envious.”33 Heaven is
Anselm, De concordia 3.3 (II:266).
Anselm, De concordia 3.4 (II:267–268).
32
I owe to Sandra Visser the observation that part of Anselm’s sense of the precariousness
of justice and the impossibility of something like Aristotelian virtue in this life must have
arisen from his experiences of seeing monks, good monks, fall into drunkenness and other
sins. Reading through his letters one sees example after example of monks tempted into
disobedience and worldliness of various kinds.
33
Anselm, De concordia 3.4 (II:268).
30
31
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promised only to those whose justice is unlimited in extent—“those who
are just without any injustice”34—but Anselm does not elaborate on how
such complete justification comes about. The point remains, however, that
any increase in justice in the soul will be a divine gift and not a human
achievement.
In De concordia 3.6 Anselm takes up an extended discussion of the cultivation of the soul, its growth in holiness through the Holy Spirit.35 If we
were going to find a doctrine of character formation anywhere in Anselm,
it would surely be here. But in fact he continues to maintain that all moral
development is gift. We can pray for an increase in justice, but we pray
only in virtue of the justice we have already received; and if we indeed
increase in justice, this will be a matter of grace and not our own doing.
Thus, Anselm says,
those who say, “Turn us, O God” (Psalm 85:4 [84:5]), have already turned
to some extent, since they have an upright will when they will to be turned.
They pray in virtue of what they have already received, in order that their
turning might be increased, like those who were already believers and said,
“Increase our faith” (Luke 17:5). It is as if both were saying, “Increase in us
what you have already given us; bring to completion what you have already
begun.”36

We do not attain greater justice by our own efforts, but by the increase of
God’s grace.
6. Conclusion
The central contention of Freedom and Self-Creation is false: Anselm does
not think that the purpose of free choice is to afford creatures the ability
to form their own characters. Yes, free choice is given to creatures in order
that they might have something for which they are genuinely responsible,
something truly “from themselves”; but for Anselm what we have from
ourselves is not our characters, but our choices. The good angels are unable to sin, not because they have developed firm characters through a
single primal choice, but because of a change external to themselves. Anselm emphasizes, not that they retain free choice (though he does affirm
this), but that they are praiseworthy for their inability to sin. (Whether
their further just choices count as determined in some way is not a question I will pursue here, but it does follow trivially that those choices are
not determined by their characters in Rogers’s sense, and therefore that
the question whether character-determined choices can be free does not
arise for Anselm.) As for human beings, whatever justice we possess in
this earthly pilgrimage is gift, not achievement; we can neither attain it

Anselm, De concordia 3.4 (II:268).
For Anselm’s pneumatology, see Williams, “God Who Sows the Seed.”
36
Anselm, De concordia 3.6 (II:272).
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nor increase it by our own efforts. Such justice, moreover, is not a secure
possession, an Aristotelian hexis: we can very easily throw it away.37
University of South Florida
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